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1. China’s net exports of food and agricultural products as a share of the sum of farm exports 
and imports was 8 percent in the 1980s and 10 percent in the 1990s (Sandri, Valenzuela, and 
Anderson 2007). It fell to –16 percent in the period 2000 to 2004 but, as the authors indicate, 
that deﬁ  cit was mainly because of the growth of cotton imports for the booming textile and 
clothing export industries.
Comment  Kym Anderson
In this chapter, the authors seek to resolve an apparent paradox: agricul-
tural protection has been reduced in China, and yet the rural sector seems 
to have prospered, and rural poverty has fallen in all regions. According to 
Ravallion, Chen, and Sangruala (2007), the share of China’s rural popu-
lation living on less than $1 a day fell from 39 percent in 1993 to 22 percent 
by 2002.
Huang et al.’s explanation is also capable of resolving a related paradox: 
China’s relatively low endowment of land per worker (below 30 percent of 
the global average) and rapid industrialization would lead one to expect its 
agricultural comparative advantage and net exports of farm products to 
have diminished over time, yet China has remained close to 100 percent self-
 suﬃcient in agricultural goods since the reforms began in the late 1970s.1
The resolution to both of these paradoxes lies mainly in reforms to price, 
trade, and ﬁ  scal policies aﬀecting farmer incentives and net transfers to 
farm households in China. The authors report empirical results from their 
country case study contribution to a multicountry World Bank research 
project on agricultural price distortions (Huang et al. 2007), as well as quali-
tative information on some other recent policy changes, to support their 
claim. Their empirical evidence shows that the price of agricultural relative 
to nonagricultural goods had been severely depressed by price and trade 
policies as of the early 1980s, but the subsequent gradual removal of that 
antiagricultural policy bias stimulated farm production. True, there was 
some reduction in protection from import competition for certain crops, but 
that was more than oﬀset by reductions in implicit taxation of agricultural 
exports. This phase-  down in the antitrade bias of agricultural policies was 
part of a more general reduction in the dispersion of nominal rates of assis-
tance (NRA) among the eleven farm products in the authors’ case study: in 
the 1980s, their mean NRA was –46 percent, and their standard deviation 63 
percent, whereas by 2000 to 2004, the mean was 1 percent, and the standard 
deviation 16 percent. That reduction in NRA dispersion allowed farmers 
previously producing goods protected from import competition to move 
from growing them to now-  more-  proﬁ  table crops.
The authors stress that many complementary domestic reforms coincided 
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rapid farm productivity growth and allow domestic production to keep 
up with the growth in domestic demand for many farm products. Indeed, 
exports of some farm products boomed, earning enough foreign currency to 
cover the increasing cost of imports of cotton and ingredients for livestock 
feed.
Notwithstanding the impressive rise in rural incomes and fall in rural 
poverty, there has been a steady increase in the ratio of urban to rural house-
hold income in China. That ratio fell from 2.5 to 1.8 between 1978 and 1983, 
but since 1985, it has risen steadily and has been above 3 in recent years, 
according to the China Statistical Yearbook. The authors list several recent 
attempts by the government to reduce that urban-  rural income inequality, 
such as greater encouragement to investments in agricultural research and 
rural infrastructure, a decoupled subsidy to grain producers, and the elimi-
nation of school fees and agricultural taxes. Yet that inequality persists.
This raises the important question—not addressed in the chapter—as to 
what the government might do in the years ahead about the recent decline 
in self-  suﬃciency in farm products and the increase in urban-  rural inequal-
ity. The ﬁ  rst wave of Asian industrializers (Japan, and then Korea and Tai-
wan) chose to slow the growth of food import dependence and urban-  rural 
inequality by raising their NRA for agriculture, such that their relative rate 
of assistance (RRA) became increasingly above the neutral zero level. Will 
China follow suit?
In the past, there has been a close association of RRAs with rising per 
capita income and falling agricultural comparative advantage (Anderson 
2009, chapter 1). When the RRAs for Japan, Korea, and Taiwan are mapped 
against real per capita income, it is possible to superimpose on that same 
graph the RRAs for lower-  income economies to see how they are tracking 
relative to the ﬁ  rst industrializers. Figure 10C.1 does that for China and 
India and shows that their RRA trends of the past three decades are on the 
same upward trajectory as the richer Northeast Asians. That alone provides 
reason to expect the governments of China and other later industrializing 
economies to follow suit if other things were equal.
Might one expect diﬀerent government behavior now, given that the ear-
lier industrializers were not bound under the General Agreement on Tariﬀs 
and Trade (GATT) to keep down their agricultural protection? Had there 
been strict discipline on farm trade measures at the time Japan and Korea 
joined the GATT in 1955 and 1967, respectively, their NRAs may have been 
halted at less than 20 percent (ﬁ  gure 10C.2). At the time of China’s acces-
sion to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in December 2001, its NRA 
was less than 5 percent according to the authors’ study, or 7.3 percent for 
just import- competing agriculture. Its average bound import tariﬀ commit-
ment was about twice that (16 percent in 2005), but what matters most is 
China’s out-  of-  quota bindings on the items whose imports are restricted by 
tariﬀ rate quotas. The latter tariﬀ bindings as of 2005 were 65 percent for Fig. 10C.1    Relative rate of assistance and log of real per capita GDP, India and 
Northeast Asian focus economies, 1955 to 2005
Source: Anderson and Martin (2009, 75)
Fig. 10C.2    Nominal rate of assistance for Japan, Korea, and China and date of ac-
cession to GATT or WTO, 1955 to 2005 (percentage)
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grains, 50 percent for sugar, and 40 percent for cotton (see the authors’ table 
10.1). China also has bindings on farm product-  speciﬁ  c domestic supports 
of 8.5 percent and can provide another 8.5 percent as non-  product speciﬁ  c 
assistance if it so wishes—a total 17 percent NRA from domestic support 
measures alone, in addition to what is available through out-  of-  quota tariﬀ 
protection. Clearly, the legal commitments China made on acceding to 
WTO are a long way from current levels of domestic and border support 
for its farmers and so are unlikely to constrain the government from raising 
agricultural support very much in the next decade or so. It thus remains to 
be seen whether the Chinese government is able to practice enough self-
 restraint to avoid following the agricultural protection growth path of earlier 
industrializing economies and to restrict any ﬁ  scal payments to investments 
with high social payoﬀs such as in rural infrastructure, rural education and 
health, and agricultural research.
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